We analyze the impact of the pro-Russian conflict on stock returns in Russia and the Ukraine during the period November 21, 2013 to September 29, 2014. We utilize a newly created indicator for the degree of (de-)escalation based on an Internet search for conflict-related news. We find that intensification of the conflict reduces Russian and Ukrainian stock returns. The (de-)escalation of the pro-Russian conflict in the Ukraine accounts for a total variation of 6.5 (8.7) percentage points in the Russian (Ukrainian) stock market.
Introduction
On November Military conflicts have economic implications not only for governments (Barro 1981) , households (Ghobarah et al. 2003) , and firms (Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007) , but also for investors around the world (Collier and Gunning 1995; Rigobon and Sack 2005; Schneider and Troeger 2006; Guidolin and La Ferrara 2010) . The mechanism is quite simple: the risk of war increases the risk of assets related to the parties involved in the conflict. Indeed, Rigobon and Sack (2005) find evidence that an increased risk of war results in investors tending to avoid assets related to the antagonists.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of the pro-Russian conflict on stock returns in Russia and the Ukraine. Our sample period starts with the beginning of the Euromaidan protests on November 21, 2013 and ends on September 29, 2014, thereby including events such as the Crimea annexation, several stages of EU sanctions, and the shooting down of the MH17 airplane on July 17, 2014. We utilize a newly created indicator for the degree of (de-)escalation based on an Internet search for conflict-related news.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to empirically assess the impact of conflict-related news on stock market returns during the pro-Russian unrest in the Ukraine. To date, Russian financial markets have been studied only in the context of the wars in Chechnya (Hayo and Kutan 2005) and Georgia (Peresetsky 2011) . This paper also investigates the possibility that the conflict will inflict medium-term damage to the Russian and Ukrainian economies as stock prices can be used to predict future economic development (Fama 1990; Estrella and Mishkin 1998; Beaudry and Portier 2006; Foresti 2007 ).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset and the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Empirical Methodology
We use daily financial data for the period November 21, 2013 to September 29, 2014 and employ as dependent variables the growth rates of the Russian MICEX index and the Ukrainian PFTS index (defined as 100 100 ).
The key challenge in analyzing the impact of conflict-related news on stock returns is finding a suitable indicator for such news. It is well-known that changes in expectations about certain events, such as future (de-)escalation of a conflict or the imposition of sanctions, can lead to a change in investor behavior before the escalation actually occurs or the sanction is implemented. That is, investors-in advance of the expected eventrearrange their portfolios based on their own assessments of (i) the severity of the conflict and (ii) the likelihood of sanctions. In contrast, actual events, for instance, the formal annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation or the announcement of sanctions by the European Union and the United States after lengthy negotiations, may come as no surprise to investors and, therefore, should not lead to a change in asset prices.
We take this into account when analyzing the impact of conflict-related news on Russian and Ukrainian stock returns and create an indicator that measures the level of escalation of the pro-Russian unrest. We use the Nexis search database and count all entries on each day for a joint occurrence of the keywords "EU sanctions," "Russia," and "Ukraine." The frequency of occurrence can be used as a proxy for the likelihood of EU sanctions on Russia or, put differently, as an indirect measure of the conflict's escalation level from an investor perspective. 1 Figure 1 shows the frequency of EU sanction news (y-axis) during some important events of the pro-Russian conflict in the Ukraine. The first peak in frequency is on March 7, 2014, one day after the Crimean parliament voted on a highly contentious referendum 1 We focus on EU sanctions since EU member states account for about 50 percent of Russian exports and imports. In addition, EU investments make up as much as 75 percent of all foreign direct investment stocks in Russia. Source: European Commission. To facilitate interpretation of the econometric analysis below we apply a log plus one transformation to the indicator variable measuring the frequency of sanctions. To proxy a true news component from an investor perspective we include the first difference of this transformed indicator as an explanatory variable in our econometric model (Δ in Equation (1) 
below).
Other explanatory variables are lagged Russian, Ukrainian, and US (S&P 500) stock market returns, which will test for weak efficiency in Russian and Ukrainian stock markets and for spillover effects from US stock markets. The impact of energy-related news on stock returns (Hayo and Kutan 2005) is captured by the first lag of the Brent spot oil price growth rate. We also take into account the impact of monetary policy on stock returns by using as additional regressors changes in the central bank target rates.
Finally, we control for day-of-the-week effects by using four dummy variables with
Monday as the reference.
Russian and Ukrainian stock returns are characterized by excess kurtosis (MICEX returns: 15.4; PFTS returns: 12.4), indicating ARCH effects (Engle 1982) . Consequently, we employ an EGARCH(1,1) model (Nelson 1991) 
Empirical Results
Table 1 sets out the results of a simultaneous estimation of Equations (1) and (2) Starting with the financial control variables we first observe that the weak efficiency condition is violated as past Russian (Ukrainian) returns are useful in predicting today's MICEX (PFTS) returns. Second, we find some evidence of international spillover effects as a 1 percentage point (pp) increase in lagged S&P 500 returns leads to a 36 basis points (bps) increase in Russian returns. Higher lagged Russian returns have a positive impact on the Ukrainian stock returns as well (3 bps after a 1 pp increase). In contrast, a 1 pp increase in lagged Ukrainian returns and in lagged US returns reduces the MICEX growth rate by 6 bps and the PFTS growth rate by 7 bps, respectively. Finally, daily oil price fluctuations affect both stock markets similarly as 1 pp increase decreases the MICEX returns by 17 bps and the PFTS returns by 16 bps. (1) and (2) using maximum likelihood. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity consistent (Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992) .
Both the Central Bank of Russia and the National Bank of Ukraine increased their target rate several times during the sample period in an effort to stabilize their currencies. Russian interest rate hikes drastically reduce stock returns in both economies as a 1 pp increase in the target rate leads to a 5.8 pp decrease in the Russian stock market returns and a 4.2 pp drop in Ukrainian returns. Interest rate changes by the National Bank of Ukraine do have an impact on Russian returns (-92 bps after a 1 pp increase) but not on the domestic stock market.
Escalation of the conflict is bad news for both stock markets as Russian returns go down by 6 bps and Ukrainian returns decrease by 8 bps; the impact is statistically equal in both economies (t = 1.08 [0.28]). To provide an approximation of the overall impact of positive and negative conflict-related news on stock market variation in both economies we multiply the cumulative absolute changes of the escalation indicator by the coefficients in Table 1 . The (de-)escalation of the pro-Russian conflict in the Ukraine accounts for a total variation of 6.52 pp in the Russian stock market and 8.73 pp in the Ukrainian stock market.
Finally, we observe a significant leverage effect in the Russian stock market as negative innovations lead to higher volatility than do positive ones, whereas is found to be insignificant for the PFTS returns.
